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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In his opening brief
previously set forth

in this matter, petitioner Williams

the facts upon which this appeal is based.

Those facts will not be repeated here.

However, in the context

of this reply brief, we note the following:
First, it should be noted that NewVector Communications,
Inc. ("NewVector") and the Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Company ("Mountain States") were both parties to the proceeding
below and in that sense they come before the Court in a little
different context than the typical amicus curiae.
Second, when they requested an opportunity to file an amici
curiae brief, NewVector and Mountain States represented to the
Court that the purpose and intent of the brief was to call to the
attention of the Court an interpretation of the Public Telecommunications Act which had not been presented in the briefs of the
parties to this appeal.
NewVector

and

Mountain

However, the brief actually filed by
States

contains,

as

its

first

two

arguments, challenges to this Court's jurisdiction to hear and
determine the merits of this appeal.

Since petitioner Williams

had already filed his final reply brief before the amicus brief
was filed, Williams sought and obtained authorization from this
Court to file this reply brief.

The only issues that will be

addressed are those dealing with the jurisdictional challenges

raised by NewVector and Mountain States, the other matters having
been adequately addressed by petitioner's prior briefs.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
NewVector and Mountain States raise essentially two challenges to the jurisdiction of this Court to consider this appeal:
First, they argue that a prerequisite to an appeal from the
dismissal of the American Paging application is a petition for
rehearing before the Public Service Commission

("Commission");

second, they contend that the exclusive recourse for review of a
rulemaking proceeding is an action for declaratory relief before
the district court.
The arguments
erroneous

for

set

multiple

forth

in the amici

reasons.

curiae brief

First, both

NewVector

are
and

Mountain States, as parties to the underlying proceedings, had
ten days after the filing of the docketing statement herein to
file a motion to dismiss these consolidated appeals for lack of
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

They, as well as the Public Service Commission and

American Paging of Utah, Inc. ("American Paging"), have waived
their opportunity to raise such issues at this late juncture.
Second, this is not an appeal from an original proceeding before
the Commission, but a continuation of the initial proceeding
following remand by this Court in Williams v. Public Service
Commission, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986).
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In the initial Commission

proceeding prior to the appeal in Williams, petitioner did in
fact request a rehearing but the request was denied.

Since this

Court in Williams did not decide all of the issues but rather
remanded

it for further consideration by the Commission, the

Court retains jurisdiction over the proceedings until the matter
is resolved in its entirety.

Thusf there was no need for an

additional petition for rehearing.
One of the grounds for the appeal is that the actions of the
Commission constitute a taking of property in violation of the
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution.

The proper

forum for reviewing a constitutional challenge to an administrative procedure is the Utah Supreme Court and not the Commission.
The statute providing for declaratory relief from rulemaking
proceedings

is permissive

and

not mandatory.

Moreover, the

requirement that a party exhaust administrative remedies is not
an absolute requirement and does not apply in the procedural
posture of this case, particularly in light of the inconsistent
procedural prerequisites that arise in a case such as this.
Finally, even if the Court were to reject cases no. 860313
and 860314, it would only postpone consideration of the issues
since

petitioner

could

still

seek

review

of

the

purported

rulemaking procedure and thereafter the Commission order based on
that rule.

Public policy and judicial economy require that the

matter be resolved now.

-3-

ARGUMENT
!•

THE PARTIES AND AMI CI CURIAE HAVE WAIVED ANY
OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO DISMISS THE APPEAL FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION,
NewVector and Mountain States argue that this appeal

must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since (1) the petitioner did not request a rehearing before the Commission with respect

to

the

application

of

American

Paging

and

(2) that

petitioner failed to seek declaratory relief from the district
court with respect to the so-called rulemaking proceeding.

This

argument is being made here for the first time by NewVector and
Mountain States and was not raised by them in a friendly way.
Neither the Public Service Commission nor American Paging asserted such arguments.

By failing to comply with Rule 10 of the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, they have waived their right
to move for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Mountain States and NewVector, as parties to the proceeding below, had an opportunity to intervene in this action and
become parties to this appeal.

Had they done so, they too would

have had ten days within which to move to dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction as provided in Rule 10. Having failed so to
do, they cannot now assert that motion by way of an amicus curiae
brief.

Furthermore, the jurisdictional

issue attempted to be

raised in their brief is beyond the scope of this Court's order
permitting the filing of amici curiae brief.
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In addition to being untimely and beyond the scope of
the procedural order of this Court, the United States Supreme
Court has held that a party may waive the requirement that all
administrative remedies be exhausted before seeking judicial review.

Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 75-77 (1976); Matthews v.

Eldridqe, 424 U.S. 319, 328-30 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749, 765 (1975).
minated
sought

without

In Eldridqe, disability benefits were ter-

a pretermination

review without

exhausting

hearing,

and

the

recipient

his administrative

remedies.

Even though the Court acknowledged that the statute, 42 U.S.C.
S 405(g), made exhaustion "a jurisdictional prerequisite" to review, and even though the Court specifically found that "Eldridge
concedes that he did not exhaust the full set

of internal-review

procedures," the Court held that the "jurisdictional prerequisite" to review can be waived.

424 U.S. at 327-330.

A recognized administrative law author and expert summarizes the rule coming out of this line of Supreme Court cases
as follows:
The proposition of law that emerges from
these cases is an exceedingly broad one: No
matter how clear the statutory or
non-statutory law may be that exhaustion is
required, the reviewing court will not require exhaustion if the agency fails to oppose review on grounds of lack of exhaustion.
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 20.13, p. 285 (1982
Supp.).
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Notwithstanding arguments by amici curiae, and notwithstanding the fact that petitioner Williams maintains that he complied with all necessary procedural prerequisites including exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Commission by failing to
raise by way of motion to dismiss the exhaustion of remedies argument, has waived the argument and the appeal is now ripe for
determination by this Court.
Amici curiae rely on the case of Utah Department of
Business Regulation v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 602
P.2d 696 (Utah 1979) for the proposition that failure to apply
for rehearing is fatal.

That case is easily distinguished from

the present case in that here the Commission did not move to dismiss for failure to request a rehearing be for seeking appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, S 54-7-15.

Additionally, the situa-

tion in Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service
Commission of Utah, supra, did not involve an appeal from a Commission proceeding following remand, the significance of which
will be pointed out in Section II of this brief.
II.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT RETAINED JURISDICTION
OVER THIS MATTER FOLLOWING ITS REMAND IN
WILLIAMS V. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, 720 P.2d 773 (UTAH 1986).
Regardless of whether the Commission's action following

remand in Williams resulted in an "order" or a "rule," the appeal
resulting from that action is not an original appeal but rather a
second appeal following remand by the Court with instructions to
-6-

the Commission to rectify certain procedural deficiencies identified in Williams,

Specifically, the Court in Williams said with

reference to the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act that:
Because the requirements of Act were not satisfied, the Rule is vacated and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings.
720 P.2d at 777.

It is generally accepted that an appellate

court relinquishes jurisdiction over a matter following remand
where the remand is administrative

in nature and the court or

agency below is required merely to enter a final order or ruling
as directed by the appellate court.
70, 72 (Hawaii 1982).

Jordan v. Hamada, 643 P.2d

However, where an appellate court does not

decide all issues with finality, but rather remands a case or
proceeding

for further proceedings or findings, the appellate

court retains jurisdiction over the matter until the court or
agency renders a final decision in the case or until the action
is terminated by the parties.
employee intervened

For example, in Jordan, a public

in a proceeding brought by the collective

bargaining unit of which he was a member challenging the reasonableness of the fee proposed by the collective bargaining unit.
The Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board issued a decision
after a hearing certifying the reasonableness of the service fee.
The employee challenged the decision in circuit court raising a
number of issues.

The circuit court judge decided nine of the

issues raised by the appeal, but remanded the three remaining
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issues to the Public Employment Relations Board for determination
in accordance with the circuit court's decision and order.

The

Board subsequently issued a second decision on the remanded issues and the employee took a second appeal to a separate division
of the circuit court.

The circuit court, confronted with the

second appeal, dismissed the appeal on the basis that the court
lacked jurisdiction to entertain the second appeal where a prior
appeal in the same case awaited final judgment.

The Hawaii Su-

preme Court affirmed the actions of the circuit court and rejected arguments that the initial reviewing court lost jurisdiction over the case following its remand to the Board.
spect to that argument, the Court stated as follows:
Appellant's position derives from a misstatement of the rule enunciated in Gin v.
Penobscot Co., 342 A.2d 270 (Me. 1975), that
an appellate court generally loses jurisdiction over a case upon its issuance of a remand order, in the absence of a statutory
proscription to the contrary.
(Citation
omitted).
As stated by the Maine Supreme
Court, this rule explicitly contemplates the
existence of a final judgment and resolution
of all issues involved in the case before the
Court's power over the same is terminated.
(Citation omitted).
The Gin rule thus merely restates the general
rule we adopted above which, when applied to
the facts above, requires us to conclude that
[the circuit court judge] correctly refused
to hear [the case]. Moreover, we find ample
authority for the proposition that a remand
order such as that involved in the present
case does not terminate the administrative
proceedingsy but is instead only one stage of
a single process which may continue to

-8-

With re-

include a second agency hearing and appeal
therefrom.
643 P.2d at 72 (emphasis added).

The general rule referred to in

the above quotation was stated by the Hawaii Supreme Court as
follows:
The precise jurisdictional question posed by
this factual situation has not been addressed
by many courts.
Nevertheless it appears
well-accepted that as a matter of law and of
sound judicial policy, a court which has acquired jurisdiction over a cause retains its
power over the same to the exclusion of any
court of coordinate jurisdiction until the
court renders a final judgment in the case or
until the action is terminated by the parties.
id.
Additionally, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 253 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1958), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the rule
stated above in declining jurisdiction over an appeal from a second agency decision following remand to the agency by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

The Ninth Circuit ex-

plained that the remand by the Court of Appeals did not terminate
the administrative proceeding and that the initial Court of Appeals retained exclusive jurisdiction to review the second agency
order.

253 F.2d at 541.

See also Great Western Broadcasting

Corp. v. Hoffman, 214 F.Supp. 173 (N.D.Cal. 1963).
The Utah Supreme Court retained exclusive jurisdiction
over the proceeding which gives rise to this second appeal.
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Thus, the district court is deprived of jurisdiction over the
rulemaking procedure contrary to the assertion by amici curiae
that failure to seek declaratory relief at the district court
level has deprived this Court of jurisdiction.

Moreover, peti-

tioner having already presented this matter during the initial
proceedings to the Commission and having sought rehearing prior
to the appeal in Williams, and then finally having gone through a
second administrative procedure before the Commission following
an appeal and remand, it would be a costly waste of resources,
time and effort to impose a reuiqrement that petitioner seek yet
another rehearing before the Commission before coming to this
Court to determine whether

the Commission

complied with this

Court's remand order.
III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT
AN ABSOLUTE PREREQUISITE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Reduced to its simplest form, the jurisdictional issue
raised by NewVector and Mountain States is merely a challenge
based on the alleged failure of petitioner Williams to exhaust
the administrative remedies.

With respect to the Commission's

dismissal of American Paging's application, that would have included a petition for rehearing to the Commission, or at least so
argue the amici curiae.

With respect to the alleged rulemaking

proceedings, amici curiae argue that before seeking review by
this Court, petitioner Williams should have obtained declaratory
relief from the district court.
-10-

Assuming, arguendo, that this

Court rejects petitioner's arguments that the Court has retained
jurisdiction over this proceeding throughout and that the parties
have waived any opportunity they might have had to seek dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction, the Court would still properly have jurisdiction over this appeal.

Amici curiae begin their analysis

based on the preconceived notion that compliance with the rehearing provision and the declaratory judgment provision are mandatory prerequisites to seeking an appeal.
necessarily accurate.

That premise is not

In his Treatise on Administrative Law,

Professor Davis highlighted the confusion that exists with respect

to the requirement

that administrative

remedies be ex-

hausted:
The answer to the question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted before a Court may review administrative action
has always been yes and no, with no clear
guides as to when it is yes and when it is
no. Since 1975 the law of exhaustion has become even more disorderly than it previously
was.
The lack of predictability is strong
enough to raise the question whether the requirement is governed by discretion rather
than by law, . . . The oft repeated statement that administrative remedies must be exhausted is false about as often as it is
true.
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, S 20.11, pp. 279-80 (1982
Supp.).
In addition to the situation where an agency does not
oppose appellate review, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated
that it may be proper to disregard the exhaustion requirement
-11-

where the constitutionality of a statute is at issue and the
agency lacks jurisdiction to determine the issue.
Salfi. 422, U.S. 749, 765 (1975).
Cleveland,
opinion).

431 U.S. 494, 526

Weinberger v.

See also Moore v. City of East

(1977) (C.J. Berger, dissenting

Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the

constitutionality of an agency's procedure may be challenged in a
reviewing court without first challenging it in the agency and
without first exhausting administrative remedies on other questions.

Matthews v. Eldridqe, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

In the pre-

sent case, petitioner Williams is challenging the procedure engaged in by the Commission as being an unconstitutional taking of
property.

The proper recourse for Williams is review by the Utah

Supreme Court rather than rehearing by the Commission.
In light of these holdings, and in light of the fact
that petitioner Williams has complied with the rules, regulations
and statutory procedures in first protesting the actions of the
Commission

in the original proceedings, thereafter seeking re-

hearing before the Commission, filing an appeal and pursuing that
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court wherein the matter was remanded
to the Commission, and having once again filed its protest and
objection in the remand proceeding before the Commission and then
finally seeking a second review by this Court of the Commission's
compliance with the remand order, to require yet another petition
for rehearing would be unnecessary.
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Petitioner Williams has

complied with all requirements that

it exhaust

administrative

remedies, and even if it had not, the necessity for such compliance is inapplicable in this case and the matter should now be
resolved on its merits and a final result reached in this case.
IV.

A DISMISSAL OF THIS CONSOLIDATED APPEAL WOULD
MERELY PROLONG RATHER THAN PRECLUDE A DETERMINATION BY THIS COURT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL.
Even if this Court were to accept the argument of amici

curiae that jurisdiction is lacking over case no. 860314 due to
petitioner's failure to seek declaratory relief from the district
court concerning the rulemaking procedure, that avenue for review
is still open under the applicable two year statute of limitations.

Utah Code Ann. S 63-46a-14 (1985) provides:
A proceeding to contest any rule on the
grounds of noncompliance with the procedural
requirements of this chapter shall commence
within two years of the effective date of the
rule.
Thus, a decision rejecting this appeal would only delay

a resolution of the dispute until such time as the matter could
be presented to the district court.

However, as pointed out pre-

viously, the district court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action due to this Court's exclusive jurisdiction following remand.

Moreover, the Rule-Making

Act may on its face preclude such a procedure, given the consolidated nature of this appeal:
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A declaratory judgment by a court may be
rendered whether or not the plaintiff has requested the agency to pass upon the applicability of the rule in question. However, the
issue of applicability may not be determined
by the district court while the issue is under consideration by the agency during any
proceeding pending before that agency or during the time the agency's decision concerning
applicability is subject to appeal or being
considered on appeal.
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46a-13(3) (emphasis added).
Assuming that an appeal would still be available to petitioner Williams in Case No. 860314 in the event of a dismissal
herein and an adverse ruling at the district court level, then an
appeal in Case No. 860313 would also still be available since the
Commission's decision which forms the basis for the appeal in
Case No. 860313 is based entirely on the alleged rulemaking proceeding

which

is

the

subject

of

Case

No.

860314.

The

Commission's order dismissing American Paging's application in
Case No. 860313 is not premised on notice, evidence, hearings,
findings or conclusions.

Rather, it is based solely and entirely

on the rule adopted by the Commission deregulating paging services and if the rule is vacated, then the Commission's dismissal
of American Paging's application based on that rule would also be
subject to challenge.
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V.

PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRES THAT THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FINALLY BE
RESOLVED.
Petitioner has set forth numerous arguments in response

to arguments by amici curiae challenging this Court's jurisdiction to hear and resolve the substantive issues raised herein.
With the consolidation of Williams v. American Paging, Inc. of
Utah, Case No. 860517, with the two cases already pending, the
identical issues are now before the Court in the context of three
separate proceedings involving virtually identical parties.
The time has come for this Court to follow up its decision in Williams v. Public Service Commission, supra, and resolve
the issues presented

in this consolidated

appeal.

To reject

these appeals on the grounds suggested by amici curiae would result in waste, unnecessary expense and injustice to all parties
and the public.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, petitioner David
R. Williams respectfully requests that the Court reject the arguments asserted by NewVector and Mountain States challenging the
jurisdiction of this Court.

Petitioner believes that all of the

parties properly before this Court desire a final decision on
these issues rather than delaying this matter further.

RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this

7

day

of

January,

1987.

KEITH E. TA^
MICHAEL L. LARSEN
of and for
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185 South State Street, Suite 700
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
BRINTON BURBIDGE
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KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner
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